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Abstract 
Vertical separation of upstream network operations from downstream retail activities, as the most 
extreme form of access regulation, has long been considered a legitimate regulatory remedy 
against use of market power in upstream infrastructure markets to engage in price- and non-price 
discrimination to foreclose competition in downstream retail markets. However, the remedy is 
increasingly being mandated for new networks, sometimes before any investment has been made. 
This paper uses theories of General Purpose Technologies and regulatory economics to consider 
how vertical separation – compared to both access regulation and no regulation - poses challenges 
to the ability to maximise scale economies at the early stage of a network life-cycle.  This 
suggests greater caution in its use at this stage compared to middle and mature phases of the life-
cycle. The theories are examined via case studies of two markets where vertical separation has 
been mandated for Fibre-to-the-Home networks – Australia and New Zealand – and one where it 
has not – the Netherlands. The case studies suggest that mandatory separation imposes additional 
constraints on the network owner’s ability to achieve scale economies arising from rapid uptake 
of a new network relative to access regulation when it fails to replicate amongst any retailers the 
vertically-integrated operator’s incentives to engage in aggressive early-stage marketing. Analysis 
also suggests that contractual limitations may have greater effect on the ability to achieve scale 
economies than structural impositions and ownership limitations.   
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Vertical separation of upstream network operations from downstream retail activities has long 
been considered as a potential constraint on the abuse of extant market power by incumbent 
network operators engaging in price- and non-price discrimination to foreclose competition in 
downstream retail markets. Despite apparent costs and risks, separation of the incumbent’s copper 
operations from retail activities has been adopted in several jurisdictions, both voluntarily and 
compulsorily as a regulatory remedy.  Increasingly, separation is being proposed as a means of 
preventing the (potential or actual) accrual of future market power by the firms deploying Next-
Generation Access Networks (NGANs) such as Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) and Fibre-to-the-node 
(FTTN).  For example, it is mandatory for government-subsidised FTTH networks in Australia, 
New Zealand and Singapore.  
 As separation is the most extreme form of access regulation, and access regulation is 
coming under increased scrutiny for its effects on investment incentives, questions arise about the 
effects on investment incentives when ‘preventative’ separation is mandated for a nascent 
infrastructure that has yet to be built. These questions pertain not just to the magnitude and timing 
of investment in the network elements, but also in the downstream retail activities necessary to 
market the new technology and encourage existing subscribers to the legacy networks to 
substitute to the frontier technology.  Specifically, what effects might arise for both upstream and 
downstream investment incentives when the co-ordinating activities internalised within a 
vertically-integrated firm are severed by separation?  And how might these incentives play out 
differently during the early stages of a technology’s life-cycle (as is occurring in the separated 
FTTH networks) relative to the later, mature stage, where recent analysis of copper network 
regulation has shown that access regulation per se, and vertical separation as its most extreme 
form, have had potentially significant effects on the likelihood, magnitude and timing of 
investment in new networks? 
 This paper addresses these questions.  
 Section One provides a literature review of vertical separation in telecommunications, in 
the context of access regulation. Section Two examines the theoretical implications for both 
network investment and retail incentives arising from vertical separation. This section utilises 
theories from the economics of General Purpose Technologies to identify the different stages of a 
technology’s life cycle to create a case that the scale economies available during the early stages 
of the diffusion of a network with very high fixed and sunk costs will lead to different optimal 
industry structures than in the middle and later stages of the life-cycle when the early scale 
economies have been exhausted.   Both access regulation and vertical separation create barriers to 
appropriating scale economies in order to maximise the welfare benefits of investment in frontier 
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networks.  However, vertical separation imposes further barriers as it prevents any retailer from 
facing financial incentives to sell as many connections to the new network as quickly as possible 
in order to appropriate the scale economy effects from a sharply-declining average cost curve.  
Where separation is not mandated, then the network’s downstream retailer (at least) shares these 
incentives, so will invest in and undertake marketing activities aligned with rapid uptake of the 
new network. Thus, ceteris paribus, mandatory separation would appear to militate against rapid 
uptake (diffusion) of the frontier network.  
 Section Three uses case studies to explore the effects of structural separation on frontier 
network diffusion rates.  Two countries where structural separation of the FTTH networks have 
been mandated in advance of investment – Australia and New Zealand – are compared with one 
where no separation mandates have been imposed – The Netherlands. In the latter case (within 
the confines of access regulation), the market participants have been free to allow the FTTH 
market structure to evolve in response to financial incentives. Section Four concludes.  
1. Vertical Separation:  Foreclosing Foreclosure 
Vertical separation of upstream network operations from downstream retail activities has long 
been considered a potential constraint on the abuse of extant market power by incumbent network 
operators engaging in price- and non-price discrimination to foreclose competition in downstream 
retail markets (Laffont & Tirole, 2002; Xavier & Ypsilanti, 2004; de Bijl, 2005; Cave, 2006).  In 
the telecommunications context it is an extreme measure, initially proposed as an ultimate 
sanction for an access-regulated firm denying a competitor regulated access to an essential good 
or service with the intent of extending its monopoly power from that segment into a potentially 
competitive segment (Rey & Tirole, 2007; Laffont & Tirole, 2002). In 2007, the European 
Commission allowed that functional separation, where the regulated firm is required to separate 
functions, employees and information, but may maintain common shareholding, but not ultimate 
ownership, “could therefore be considered where all other regulatory tools have proved 
inadequate to address market and competition failures” (European Commission, 2007, p. 43).  
 Despite its appeal in managing risks of downstream foreclosure, separation is not without 
costs and risks. Telecommunications networks have sizeable economies of scale and scope 
enabling cost synergies which arguably are lost when separation of a single vertically-integrated 
operator is mandated (Gonçalves & Nascimento, 2010; Howell, Meade & O’Connor, 2010). It is 
subject to many of the same concerns about potential diminishing of investment incentives for 
both incumbents and entrants as access regulation, of which (in the primacy given to the 
development of services-based competition over infrastructure competition), it is the most 
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extreme  form (Tropina, Whalley & Curwen, 2010; Brito, Pereira & Vareda, 2011). Furthermore, 
under certain circumstances, even though separation eliminates discrimination, it is not 
guaranteed to increase welfare (Chikhladze &Mandy, 2009; Brito, Pereira & Vareda, 2010; 
Heatley & Howell, 2010a; 2010b).   
 Notwithstanding, functional separation of the incumbent telecommunications operator 
has been adopted in several jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom (Cadman, 2010), and 
Italy (Nucciarelli & Sadowski, 2010; Mancuso, 2012), and is considered favourably in several 
others (Tropina, Whalley & Curwen, 2010).  After briefly experimenting with functional 
separation, New Zealand mandated full structural separation of its copper incumbent in 2011, as a 
condition of its participation in the government-subsidised Ultra-Fast Broadband project (Howell, 
2012; 2013).   
 Despite cautions about its status as an extreme and likely irreversible measure (de Bijl, 
2005), separation has not always arisen from principled economic analysis. Regulatory theory 
posits that separation may be justified when the incumbent firm’s market power in the relevantly-
defined market has been established, other less-intrusive forms of access regulation have failed to 
bring about the desired competition in the downstream market, there is evidence of discrimination 
occurring, and a cost-benefit analysis confirms that network separation will be both of net benefit 
and more effective than any other regulatory remedy (Kirsch & von Hirschhausen, 2008; 
Gonçalves & Nascimento, 2010).  However, no example appears to exist of separation being 
adopted as a regulatory remedy on the basis of a principled inquiry including a favourable 
empirical cost-benefit analysis. In the United Kingdom, functional separation was voluntarily 
adopted by incumbent as part of a negotiated arrangement with the regulator (Cadman, 2010).  In 
New Zealand, both functional and structural separations were imposed via legislative fiat, 
bypassing the typical regulatory processes for assessing the implementation of such remedies, 
with minimal supporting policy analysis and no empirical analysis (Howell, 2009; 2010).  
Arguably, its use in these cases was motivated more by the desire to sanction an incumbent for 
past transgressions than from a principled analysis of future market structure options in a 
technologically-dynamic industry.  
 Increasingly, separation is also being proposed as a regulatory means of preventing the 
(potential or actual) accrual of future market power by the firms deploying Next-Generation 
Access Networks (NGANs) such as Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) and Fibre-to-the-node (FTTN) 
(Kirsch & von Hirschhausen, 2008; Huigen & Cave, 2008; Whalley & Henten, 2010; Cadman, 
2010). In some countries – notably Australia, New Zealand and Singapore – structural separation 
has been mandated for FTTH networks as a condition of government funding (Given, 2010; 
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Given & Middleton, 2010; Howell, 2012). Whilst, arguably, separation of FTTN operators might 
be considered to continue the regulation of an incumbent operator (as FTTN investment enhances 
existing infrastructure), the same cannot be said of separation of completely new FTTH networks. 
This begs the question of whether separation of FTTH networks has been proposed for its 
economic merit in governing the development of emerging markets as the legacy copper 
infrastructure is replaced by frontier fibre technology or, as in past use of copper separation, it is 
primarily a means of constraining an incumbent firm exhibiting dominance and potentially 
discriminatory behaviour in the legacy markets from transferring that power into frontier markets.  
In the absence of empirical analysis, it cannot be excluded that regulatory focus is primarily on a 
specific firm rather than on the evolution of the market in which the new network will be 
deployed. The distinction is material because, for a transition period at least, the frontier and 
legacy networks will compete with each other for retail consumers.  This is fundamentally 
different from the situation when ADSL as the frontier internet access technology superseded 
legacy dial-up (and indeed, as VDSL supersedes ADSL), as both were provided on the same 
copper network.  
2. Regulation, ‘Preventative’ Separation and Market Evolution   
‘Preventative’ separation, mandated before any investment has occurred in frontier infrastructures, 
and imposed upon all potential network operators, regardless of whether or not they have any 
presence in the relevant markets, is a very strong ‘remedy’.  It addresses a ‘monopoly problem’ in 
a theoretical ‘monopoly market’ which may not even eventuate, given that infrastructure 
competition (at least in duopoly, oligopoly or monopolistic competition form) is anticipated to be 
the predominant future internet access market structure (Hazlett & Weisman, 2011; Renda, 2010).  
 The motivation to prevent the development of a dominant position in the new market may 
be commendable. However, separation cannot be considered in isolation from existing regulation 
or market characteristics. If legacy regulation is predicated upon the ‘ladder of investment’ 
purportedly incentivising competitors to invest ultimately in competing networks (Cave, 2006a), 
then in addition to distortions in investment incentives from the ‘ladder’ (Bacache, Bourreau & 
Gaudin, 2014; Bourreau, Dogan & Manant, 2010), mandating separation for all FTTH networks 
militates against any competitor to the incumbent climbing the ladder to network ownership as all 
benefits acquired by amassing a retail customer base by leasing elements from the incumbent 
must be forfeited when building the FTTH network
1
. The effect is to reinforce the existing 
                                                     
1 Howell (2012) identifies this as a potential explanation for none of the unbundling competitors to the 
incumbent tendering for the New Zealand government-funded FTTH subsidy programme.  The two largest 
were significant network investors (in mobile and cable respectively) so would have had cost advantages 
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dominance of the copper network provider, as (absent any other infrastructure competition) it is 
the only (copper) market participant with an incentive to invest in a frontier fibre network. If the 
regulator’s intention is simply to prevent the transfer of market power in the legacy network to 
the frontier network, then horizontal separation (either functional or structural) of (vertically 
integrated) copper and fibre networks is both less intrusive than vertical structural separation 
between network and retail, and has precedents in the competition law governing mergers and 
acquisitions
2
.   
2.1  A Pre-Determined Structural Prescription for a Dynamic Market 
Furthermore, ‘preventative’ separation imposes a pre-determined market structure on a yet-to-be-
deployed infrastructure in a rapidly-evolving and technologically dynamic environment that 
appears to close out any possibility of evolutionary market development in response to 
competitive interaction between the legacy and frontier networks. To be economically justified, 
the costs of downstream foreclosure must be so large that no other market structure could 
possibly be contemplated, despite the considerable uncertainty associated with new technologies.  
If this is not the case, then ‘preventative’ separation appears to signal a return to historic 
centralised market design, control and network planning reminiscent of an era dominated by 
government telecommunications ownership, which was characterised by the suppression of 
technologically-led market dynamism. Interestingly, to date, mandatorily vertically separate 
FTTH infrastructures feature more prominently when governments (either national or municipal) 
are substantial funders.  
 As a variant of access regulation, structural separation invokes inevitable trade-offs 
between the pursuit of static and dynamic efficiencies. Yet FTTH is a new technology that itself 
is contributing to Schumpeterian market dynamism where economic growth is driven by 
“imperfect” competition, “the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the 
new source of supply, the new type of organizations (Schumpeter, 1975: p 85).  In this context, 
the optimal market structure at any given point in time is not static and exogenously imposed, but 
fluid and endogenously determined.  It is not evident ex ante that one specific market structure 
will be optimal over the entire life cycle of the technology. Imposing a predetermined structure 
overrides endogenous development of growth-enhancing institutions and relationships made 
possible by new information not available at the outset when the market structure is imposed 
(Guthrie, 2006).  The exogenously imposed market structure even if initially optimal, will 
                                                                                                                                                         
over the successful non-incumbent tenderers (electric lines companies and a municipality) given existing 
access to rights of way and backhaul infrastructure.  
2 For example, between telephony and cable TV networks in the late 1990s.  
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inevitably be ‘wrong’ at some point of the life-cycle, necessitating changes if new benefits are to 
be appropriated. For example, integrated monopoly may have been optimal in the early stages of 
copper telephony, but not in the middle to later stages of its lifecycle, which required structural 
changes made possible by market liberalisation to enable both private and societal benefits 
(Wallsten, 2005).  
 It is both timely and apposite therefore to consider how a predetermined separated market 
structure might influence both the behaviour of FTTH market participants and outcomes relative 
to those in a counterfactual where no such limitations have been imposed (i.e. vertical integration 
is permitted) in the early stages of the technology’s life-cycle.  
2.2 FTTH in a GPT Context 
Internet access (i.e. broadband) is frequently claimed to be a General Purpose Technology (GPT). 
In this context, copper broadband access can be considered the legacy internet access GPT and 
fibre broadband the frontier (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). GPTs exhibit three distinct ‘stages’ 
in their life cycle (Bresnahan & Yin, 2010).  To capitalise upon the exploitation of increasing 
returns in the initial period of deployment, co-ordination on a particular technology direction is 
required.  This reduces flexibility and choice, and potentially leads to the creation of bottlenecks, 
but is essential for the initial increasing returns to be generated. The benefits of allowing a period 
of market power for the first investor are outlined in the case for FTTN and FTTH operators to be 
given ‘regulatory holidays’ to incentivise investment (Gans & King, 2003).  The second stage, 
where the bottleneck manifests as lower growth, is where reallocation of innovative resources 
around the bottleneck should occur in order to stimulate the third stage, where an alternative GPT 
competes the original one out of the market.     
  If FTTH is considered to be a GPT, then in the early stages of its deployment, 
maximising the potential of economies of scale is paramount. If co-ordination between the 
network and retail activities of an FTTH operator is critical to capitalising upon scale economies, 
then vertical integration will be the optimal initial market structure. Separation militates against 
this, so at best will slow the rate at which the dynamic efficiency gains from the presence of the 
new technology are realised, and at worst may prevent them from being accrued at all (e.g. by 
foreclosing investment in the first place).  However, allowing an initial period of market power 
does not preclude the subsequent introduction of regulatory remedies (e.g. access regulation or 
even separation) to militate against the period of lesser contributions to growth that arises from an 
integrated provider as the market matures. Indeed, the need to vary the prices at which access is 
granted to an incumbent’s infrastructure relative to marginal cost across the middle and later   
stages of the life cycle of access-regulated copper networks in order to provide the appropriate 
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balance between static and dynamic efficiency gains to promote stimulate investment in frontier 
FTTN and FTTH is already recognised (Lestage & Flacher, 2014).   
2.3 Appropriating Scale Economies in Early-Stage FTTH 
The crucial factor in determining the optimal market structure in the initial stages of FTTH 
deployment is capturing scale economies.  Around 90% of the fixed and sunk costs of an FTTH 
network investment pertain to infrastructure elements (Layer 1 and 2), with only around 10% 
pertaining to (Layer 3) retail activities (Heatley & Howell, 2010).  As with all infrastructures 
characterised by very high fixed (and sunk) costs and low marginal costs, the early stages of the 
deployment of FTTH is characterised by a steeply downward-sloping supply (average cost) curve.  
The more connections to the network that are sold, the lower is the average cost per connection 
(Figure 1 – it costs PB < PA to sell QB > QA connections). For this reason when an operator invests 
in a new network, there is an imperative to sell as many connections as quickly as possible to 
rapidly appropriate the gains from decreasing average costs.  
2.3.1 Price Discrimination 
Despite its common pejorative linguistic usage, discrimination does not necessarily imply a 
detrimental outcome. It derives from the Latin discriminatus
3
 meaning to divide or separate based 
upon the ability to recognise and understand the difference between one thing and another
4
.   
 Price discrimination is a classic means by which producers with access to economies of 
scale can sell more units in the early stage of a network’s life.  It is possible when the supplier has 
the means to distinguish between two (or more) different customer types – for example, early 
adopters with very high willingness to pay for a new good, and those who would not be prepared 
to pay a high price initially. As suggested by Bresnahan & Yin (2010), in the early stages of a 
GPT, price discrimination enables welfare gains to be appropriated by capitalising on economies 
of scale arising from the steeply-decreasing average cost curve. Given the black demand curve 
(Figure 2), the monopolist breaks even selling QA connections at a single price PA (arguably, the 
price a regulator would set under access regulation, so that all retailers pay the same ‘fair’ price 
and the network operator covers costs).  The monopolist could sell a further (QB-QA) units at PC.  
The cost per unit of producing QB units (PB) is less than the cost per unit of producing QA units 
(PA), but exceeds the price at which the additional units are sold (PC). The monopolist’s profit 
increases because the surplus from selling QA units at PA (the dotted blue rectangle) exceeds the 
losses from selling the additional units below cost at PC (the wavy blue rectangle). There is a net 
                                                     
3 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=discriminate  
4 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/discrimination  
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gain in welfare (static efficiency gain). Consumers are better off.  The higher-paying purchasers 
are no worse off than if there was just a single price.  The lower-paying purchasers are better off – 
they have a connection that they would not have bought at the single price. And the monopolist is 
better off than the break-even regulated price, because profits are made.   
 This welfare-enhancing scenario is possible only when the average cost curve is steeply 
falling (scale economies exist) – such as in the initial stages of a network build - and most 
profitable when there is a wide variation in customers’ willingness to pay (i.e. a steeply declining 
(inelastic) demand curve).  This is almost certainly the case in the early stage of a new technology 
when a small number of early adopters are willing to pay a substantial premium to access the 
technology, but the vast majority of consumers will not be prepared to pay a large sum until the 
benefits have been demonstrated. It is not likely to be welfare-enhancing when the technology is 
widely diffused ( a large number of connections have been sold) and the average cost curve is 
relatively flat – as occurs in a mature technology.  At this stage of the technology’s life cycle it is 
market power, and not cost structure, that primarily gives rise to the incentives to engage in price 
discrimination. However, even at this stage, careful analysis is required to ascertain whether the 
purpose is to transfer welfare from high-valuing consumers to low-valuing ones paying below 
cost (classic ‘Ramsey Prices’) or to maximise producer profits (Höffler, 2004).    
 Furthermore, price discrimination can lead to a network operator bringing the new 
technology to market sooner than if a single price is mandated, realising dynamic efficiency gains. 
Figure 3 shows the case of a cost curve sitting above the demand curve (D) for all possible 
quantities.  Under this scenario, there is no single price at which it is economically feasible to 
produce.  This is precisely what occurs in the early stage of a new technology when there are only 
a few individuals who know what it can do.  In the fullness of time, demand will grow and the 
demand curve will push out to D’, when it will be feasible to find a single price at which the 
operator will find it worthwhile to invest and produce. But with demand curve D, there will be no 
investment and no network if a single price must be charged. However, charging P1 to the Q1 
highest-valuing consumers and P2 to the remaining Q2 –Q1 consumers allows Q2 units to be 
produced at a cost of P3 each. If the profits from the first (area A) exceed the losses from the 
second (area B), then the monopolist will build the network earlier than if regulation requires 
access to be sold at a single regulated price.  The welfare benefits of the new network are 
appropriated earlier than if a single price is charged.  This constitutes the dynamic efficiency gain 
which exists in addition to any static efficiency gains arising from price discrimination increasing 
the total number of connections sold. 
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2.3.2 Access Regulation Impedes Price Discrimination Benefits 
On the basis of this analysis, both structural separation and access regulation counter-indicate the 
accrual of welfare gains by precluding the network operator from engaging in retail price 
discrimination, as both require network elements to be sold at a single (common) price to all 
competing retailers. The literature on access regulation considers trading off static efficiency 
gains against dynamic efficiency gains arising from investment in network enhancements when 
regulating an existing network, which leads to optimal prices above long run average cost when 
future returns are uncertain (Lestage & Flacher, 2014). However, the preceding discussion  shows 
that even regulating at average cost will prevent accrual of both static and dynamic gains arising 
from the particular scale economy effects prevailing in the early stage of network deployment 
where the strongest scale economies apply. 
 Analysis of Figures 1 to 3 suggests that a vertically-integrated network operator (or at 
least, one not precluded from engaging directly with end consumers) would seek to engage in 
welfare-enhancing price discrimination immediately after having deployed a new network, in 
order to rapidly grow connection numbers and gain the scale economy benefits. For example, 
cable television operators are frequently observed to offer free connections and substantially  
discounted ‘trial periods’ to consumers who did not voluntarily seek to connect when their 
networks were first deployed in a locality. Yet somewhat ironically, a vertically integrated, 
regulated telecommunications firm’s retail arm offering such discounts for its new FTTH network 
exposes itself to accusations of discriminatory bias that could lead to separation being applied as 
a sanction, even though the firm’s actions are welfare-enhancing. This reinforces the need to 
undertake case-specific cost-benefit analyses before imposing separation as a regulatory remedy.  
2.3.3 Separation Disconnects Retailers from Scale Economy Incentives 
Whilst access regulation alone limits the ability to engage in welfare-enhancing price 
discrimination, relative to a vertically-integrated access-regulated operator, a structurally-separate 
network operator faces greater impediments to rapidly accessing scale economies because no 
retailer faces the incentives provided by reducing average costs as the number of new connections 
to the new network increases.  A vertically-integrated operator may engage in non-price activities 
(e.g. marketing effort) in order to accelerate network uptake, but retailers with no exposure to 
network investment face no particular incentives to prioritise marketing of the new network.  This 
suggests that the retail effort exerted to sell connections to the new separated network will be less 
than that observed in an integrated counterfactual, where at least the integrated operator 
appropriates the benefits from rapid uptake.   
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 Furthermore, whilst there may be many retailers potentially able to sell the FTTH 
connections, the new networks are being deployed in a market where the legacy copper and cable 
connections are widely deployed, retailers already have established relationships with consumers 
and fibre connections will be sold for the most part as substitutes for existing copper connections.  
Unless retailers get a higher margin from selling FTTH connections than copper ones, they face 
few incentives to invest in aggressive marketing campaigns for the new network. Indeed, the 
costs of marketing may actually lead to lower retailer returns from selling a substitute FTTH 
connection to an existing copper customer than taking no action and retaining the customer on the 
legacy connection. This leads to even more delays in the rate at which fibre connections will be 
sold.  
 Moreover, new FTTH networks are being deployed gradually, one neighbourhood at a 
time.  In a market where access regulation has been in place, it is most likely that the customers 
of any one retailer will be scattered around and not contiguously located within a specific 
geographic area. Whereas the network owner’s retailer faces strong incentives to market the new 
connections to every premise passed in a street (the ‘door-knocking’ common amongst cable 
sellers), a separated retailer may have only a handful of customers in any given street.  There is 
no particular incentive for any retailer to co-ordinate marketing effort with the network operator’s 
fibre-laying activities (e.g. by sending door-knockers into a locality) given that any or all of the 
other retailers may be doing the same thing.  If they all invest in ‘door-knockers’, then (in the 
manner of monopolistically competitive markets where fixed and sunk costs must be expended 
before sales are made – Carlton & Perloff, 2005, p216-9) a risk exists that none can perfectly 
assess the marketing efforts of the other, too many will engage in the marketing exercise and 
inefficiently too much will be spent trying to persuade a fixed number of consumers to purchase a 
fibre connection. As each can anticipate this outcome, an equilibrium may emerge where none 
invests in marketing, awaiting information about what the others plan to do. If this occurs, then 
the FTTH network lays under-utilised, even though it has been deployed.  As the separated 
network operator too can anticipate this eventuality, then network investment will be delayed to 
an even greater extent than would be anticipated under access regulation and integrated network 
and retail operations. That is, separation imposes even greater investment delays than access 
regulation alone.  
 In sum, therefore, the theory supports the contention that access regulation impedes the 
ability to obtain scale economy benefits available from price discrimination in a new FTTH 
network, and that structural separation further impedes the ability to maximise scale-related cost 
reductions relative to an integrated but regulated operator by impeding the ability to co-ordinate 
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network deployment and marketing effort. In practice, this would manifest itself as (all else held 
equal) a slower diffusion rate of FTTH connections in markets where separation is mandatory. 
3. Case Studies 
The inability to set up control and treatment groups precludes empirical testing of the proposition 
that FTTH uptake will be slower in markets where FTTH is being deployed under separation 
mandates.  Case studies allow the comparison of observations in different markets, albeit that 
institutional differences other than separation may also influence uptake rates.  Nonetheless, case 
studies may, when taking account of known differences, provide evidence that is consistent with 
(or contradictory to) the proposition.  
 This section uses case studies to compare FTTH deployment and uptake in two markets 
where structural separation is mandated – Australia and New Zealand – and one where it is not – 
the Netherlands.  FTTH deployment in Australia and New Zealand is occurring under the aegis of 
government funding initiatives – the National Broadband Network (NBN) in Australia and the 
UltraFast Broadband (UFB) initiative in New Zealand. Whilst some municipally-funded networks 
have been deployed in the Netherlands (Kramer, Lopez & Koonen, 2006), privately-funded major 
commercial operator Reggefiber accounts for over 90% of fibre connections sold
5
.  All three 
countries have long histories of access regulation (albeit that New Zealand was somewhat slower 
to adopt it than the other two, implementing access regulation in 2001, bitstream unbundling in 
2004 and full local loop unbundling in 2006), and New Zealand’s copper incumbent has been 
required to structurally separate (this has not been required in the other two). The other major 
difference is that in Australia, the government policy requires copper to be decommissioned when 
fibre is installed in a locality, but in the other two countries, copper and fibre networks are 
assumed to compete with each other indefinitely.    
3.1  Australia and New Zealand 
FTTH network deployment commenced in Australia in 2010 and in New Zealand in 2011. The 
Australian arrangements are based upon a fully government-owned structurally separate network 
operator NBN Co intended to reach over 90% of the Australian population, whilst in New 
Zealand the government has subsidised around 25% of the cost of deploying FTTH to 70% of the 
country via four public-private partnerships (Howell, 2012; 2013).  
                                                     
5 http://www.buddeblog.com.au/frompaulsdesk/some-fundamentals-of-dutch-fibre-success/ 
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 Institutional
6
 and data collection
7
 differences make direct comparisons of uptake rates 
difficult.  However, in both cases, uptake rates are lower than expected. At the end of 2013, 27% 
of the planned New Zealand rollout had been completed
8
  but only 5.5% of premises passed had 
connected to the network. In Australia, uptake rates of between 30% and 40% of premises passed 
are claimed
9
, but the rollout targets have been revised downward several times due to failure to 
meet initial targets.  The Australian budget has expanded substantially from its initial $A43 
billion (Howell, 2013).   
 On first examination, the large difference in uptake rates between Australia and New 
Zealand appear to contradict the proposition that separation impedes uptake rates. However, it is 
most likely an institutional difference in the terms of the government subsidy programme that 
accounts for the difference. In Australia the owners of the incumbent copper and cable networks – 
Telstra and Optus – are compensated for each customer who transitions from the legacy networks 
to FTTH. The compensation payments account for around $10 billion of the original $43 billion 
project budget, but are paid only when each customer transition has been completed.  This 
payment has the same effect as allowing retailers a margin premium for migrating consumers 
from copper to fibre to speed up the acquisition of scale economies by the network operator. As 
retailers, both Telstra and Optus face strong incentives to promote rapid substitution to the new 
network via both direct and indirect marketing efforts to bring forward the payment of the 
‘substitution bounty’.  As the incumbent access-regulated copper operator, Telstra also faces 
strong incentives to make it desirable for its resale and unbundling retailers to transfer their 
consumers to the net network.  It would be unsurprising if Telstra was not sharing some of the 
‘substitution bounty’ with its wholesale customers to speed up the transition (in a similar manner 
as it was observed that interconnection revenues were used strategically by network operators to 
increase dial-up internet connection rates in the late 1990s – Karel, 2003).  
 Hence the rapid uptake rate in Australia occurs because a further contractual arrangement 
overrides the negative incentives that would normally be associated with a separated network. 
However, these incentives come at a very significant additional cost to the NBN rollout, and 
would unlikely be necessary to induce an unregulated operator to invest.  
                                                     
6 In Australia, NBN is intended to preplace the copper network, whereas in New Zealand, the copper 
network remains as a competitor to the UFB. 
7
 There is confusion in Australia about whether cited uptake rates represent operational connections or 
simply approvals for future deployment.   
8http://www.amyadams.co.nz/index.php?/archives/1128-More-than-a-quarter-of-UFB-project-
complete.html  
9 http://www.zdnet.com/rollout-not-slowing-down-as-nbn-co-quietly-smashes-targets-7000028007/  
http://www.iscr.org.nz -- 15 -- 
iscr@vuw.ac.nz 
 However, no such incentives apply in New Zealand.  The four UFB network operators 
are exposed to the full ramifications of separated retailers with diminished incentives to market 
fibre connections.  The two main ISPs Spark
10
 (formerly Telecom) and Vodafone
11
, who together 
have a broadband market share of around 80%, were very slow to develop fibre plans. Initial 
plans from these firms were still not available nearly a year after the first fibres were laid. Even 
once plans were developed, marketing of them also appears to be minimal.  It is also nationally-
focused rather than targeted at the areas where fibre networks are being deployed. Neither gives 
fibre priority over other broadband offerings in their nationally-focused websites.  However, the 
third-largest ISP Orcon
12
 (15% market share) has been more active in marketing fibre and to date 
has more customers connected to the UFB than any other ISP.  This is most likely because it has 
historically been the innovation leader in New Zealand, and as a consequence has a much larger 
proportion of early adopters in its customer base than the larger two.  It thus has a biased 
selection of customers and likely faces lower marketing costs as early adopters are likely to 
choose to substitute to fibre without having to be persuaded by marketing efforts.  
 On first examination, the very much lower uptake rates in New Zealand pose significant 
financial risks to the UFB network operators, as the scale economies are not being rapidly 
realised.  However, the terms of the public-private partnerships shield the three non-incumbent 
network operators from financial risks of slow uptake, as the government has funded the network 
rollout and the partners buy shares in it only when customers connect and start buying services 
(Sadowski, Howell & Nucciarelli, 2013). The same is not true for Chorus, the structurally 
separate copper incumbent and contactor for 70% of the FTTH project.  Chorus underwrites the 
deployment of fibre it deploys (albeit part-funded by interest-free government loans) and 
financial penalties if it fails to meet specific uptake targets. Whilst Chorus is aggressively 
marketing the concept of fibre connections both as it deploys in a given locality and nationally   
(e.g. with its’ Gigatown competition13), it cannot market connections directly to consumers. It is 
ultimately the responsibility of the end consumer to contact a retailer to instigate the installation 
process.   
  Indeed Chorus appears to be doubly disadvantaged as a separated copper legacy and 
frontier fibre network operator.  The firm faces regulatory ‘double jeopardy’ as ongoing 
regulation of the copper network threatens to undermine deployment of the fibre network (Howell, 
2013). Arguably, a variation of the hold-up problem that occurs when separated downstream 
                                                     
10 http://www.spark.co.nz/shop/internet/  
11 http://www.vodafone.co.nz/broadband/  
12 http://www.orcon.net.nz/  
13 http://gigatown.co.nz/  
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retail firms endeavour to earn quasi-rents by playing strategic games after the upstream firm has 
made relationship-specific investments (Cadman, 2010; Ergas, 2007) is playing out in addition to 
the diminished incentives. Legislation passed after the fibre prices were agreed requires the 
copper regulator
14
 to set copper prices in a manner that means they will fall substantially in 
December 2014 from the levels prevailing when the PPP terms were agreed.  The separated 
retailers can now potentially increase their margins on copper connections if they do not pass 
through the anticipated 25% copper price reductions fully to consumers.  This even further 
reduces their incentives to market fibre connections in the present. Indeed, a number of ISPs were 
prominent supporters of a public relations campaign vilifying Chorus’s endeavours to use a 
combination of legislative, regulatory and judicial means to get the proposed copper price 
reduction reversed
15
.  
 Thus, the New Zealand evidence is consistent with structural separation being a major 
delaying factor in FTTH uptake.  There are clear disconnections between the incentives facing 
retailers and the objectives of Chorus, at least, to capitalise upon scale economy benefits.  Unlike 
Australia, other institutional arrangements appear to exacerbate the separation delays rather than 
ameliorating them. The cost to the government is lower, but the costs of foregone dynamic 
efficiency benefits from fewer connections than is optimal are likely very large.     
3.2 The Netherlands 
In sharp contrast with Australia and New Zealand, FTTH deployment in the Netherlands is bound 
by neither structural separation nor (in the large part) government funding. Private operator 
Reggefiber
16
 has been deploying FTTH since 2005.  In 2008, the incumbent copper operator KPN 
acquired a 41% share in the firm
17
. Reggefiber supplies over 90% of fibre connections in the 
Netherlands. At the end of 2013, nearly 10% of Dutch broadband connections were fibre-based, 
and the Netherlands had the second-highest broadband penetration in the OECD (after 
Switzerland)
18
.  By Quarter 1, 2009, Reggefiber had laid fibre past 336,000 premises and sold 
106,000 connections – an uptake rate of 31%19. This compares to New Zealand’s uptake rate of 
5.5% at the end of 2013 when a similar number of premises had been passed.  By quarter 4 2011, 
951,000 premises had been passed and 277,000 connections sold
20
, confirming that the uptake 
                                                     
14 Both regulation and network operation are separated in New Zealand  - see Howell (2012).  
15 http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/digital-living/9237280/Axe-the-Tax-group-hopeful-after-Key-
comment  
16
 http://www.eindelijkglasvezel.nl/  
17 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Wouter.pdf  
18 http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/1d-OECD-WiredWirelessBB-2013-12.xls  
19 http://www.apritel.org/fotos/editor2/Jan_van_Rooijen.pdf  
20 http://www.slideshare.net/INCA_NextGen/reggefiber  
http://www.iscr.org.nz -- 17 -- 
iscr@vuw.ac.nz 
rate of around 30% has been stable over time and across the localities where the network has been 
deployed.   
 Reggefiber’s business model is to be a passive network operator, so it appears outwardly 
to operate in a similar manner to the structurally separate Australian and New Zealand networks. 
Other network operators (including KPN) supply the active network elements and then retail 
service providers (including KPN) bundle services sold to consumers. Reggefiber does not have 
an ongoing commercial relationship with end consumers.  In this manner, it closely resembles 
local distributors in structurally-separate electricity networks (Howell, Meade & O’Connor, 2010). 
However, fundamental differences attend the marketing of the initial connections when the 
network is deployed. Reggefiber’s rollout is not predicated upon the ‘build it and users will come’ 
model of the New Zealand UFB, but is much closer to the cable television model of working 
closely within a local community to ascertain economies of scale will be obtained immediately 
the network is deployed.  When Reggefiber targets an area for potential deployment, it contacts 
all potential consumers seeking binding commitments to purchase a fibre connection when it 
becomes available. When at least 30% of householders commit, the network is deployed
21
.  This 
minimises financial risk and ensures that the majority of economies of scale available from large 
numbers of consumers are obtained immediately. The local municipality is typically involved at 
this early stage, assisting with the co-ordination of marketing and facilitating community 
members to jointly consider the benefits of bringing fibre to their locality.    
 The Reggefiber business model is possible because there are no regulatory impediments 
preventing the network operator from working the manner of an integrated operator and 
marketing fibre connections directly to end consumers in the very earliest stage of network 
deployment.  Reggefiber is directly involved in the initial marketing of connections, even though 
it does not have an ongoing retail relationship with end consumers. Although the municipality 
may assist with initial marketing, it is not a direct network investor, in the manner of the 
government in Australia and New Zealand.  Reggifiber’s success does not depend upon KPN 
being a part-owner, although that may lead to lower transaction costs from co-ordinating the 
interfaces between the passive and active layers relative to other providers.  Whilst it cannot be 
discounted that there may be some potential opportunities subsequently for Reggefiber and KPN 
to exploit their relationship, at the early stages of deployment, it does not appear to have inhibited 
the ability for widespread deployment of FTTH that both captures scale economies and does not 
rely upon large government subsidies to either deploy the network or induce substitution from 
copper.  
                                                     
21 http://www.eindelijkglasvezel.nl/corporate/?sc_lang=en&preflang=en  
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 Whilst Reggefiber does not rely upon price discrimination to acquire scale economies, it 
has relied upon non-price discrimination, in that its direct approaches to consumers have allowed 
it to determine the localities in which the greatest numbers of individuals willing to pay for fibre 
connections are located.  The ‘discrimination’ occurs because it is those communities that receive 
the option of fibre connections first. Arguably, this ensures that the scarce financial resources for 
building fibre networks are allocated most efficiently (to those communities whose residents on 
average value fibre connections most highly). Again, this contrasts to the New Zealand and 
Australian networks, where fibre is deployed according to political priorities. 
 The Netherlands case shows that, where no preconceived ideas of market structure o0r 
limitations on commercial relationships exist, it is possible for new institutional arrangements to 
emerge that differ from the arrangements in legacy markets.  Reggefiber has voluntarily adopted 
a functionally-separate business model, but this works because it does not face contracting 
restrictions with end consumers at the time it is most important to co-ordinate direct marketing – 
when the connections are first laid. This suggests that contractual regulatory provisions may be 
more important than structures when seeking to maximise scale economy effects in the early 
stages of a network’s life-cycle.   
4. Conclusion  
The case studies reveal that the rate at which FTTH networks are diffusing in New Zealand is 
considerably slower than in the  Netherlands,  Despite other regulatory institutions potentially 
also affecting the rate, structural separation is most likely contributing to the delay.  Whilst the 
Australian diffusion rate is similar to that of the Netherlands, this is likely because a 
compensation clause in the Australian arrangements replicates the incentives for rapid diffusion 
to obtain scale economy effects enjoyed by firms not bound by vertical separation obligations.  
However, this is very costly and, as shown by the Netherlands case, is not necessary when the 
network operator is able to co-ordinate marketing of network connections in the earliest stages of 
network deployment. 
 The Netherlands case study shows that it may still be feasible for institutional 
arrangements resembling a separated market to evolve endogenously when there is no 
preconceived idea (beyond access regulation) or exogenous imposition of a ‘correct’ market 
structure.  Importantly, the case shows that the limiting factors are not inherent in the ownership 
of the firms, but in the restrictions in the contractual activities that the different firms may engage 
in.  In New Zealand, it is the rules preventing network operators directly engaging with individual 
end consumers that appear to be slowing diffusion. In the Netherlands, even though Reggefiber is 
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not the firm that ultimately retails the connections, its end consumer engagement in the pre-
rollout phase is crucial to its ability to achieve scale economies quickly.  
 In sum, therefore, the theory and case studies both appear to confirm that vertical 
separation – whether structural or contractual – delays the accrual of welfare benefits from new 
technologies in the early stages of their life cycle.   Whilst in most cases the remedy is seen as a 
structural tool, the contracts associated with the regulation appear to be more important than the 
issue of ownership in this early stage. Nothing in this analysis is contrary to the position that 
regulatory instruments such as access regulation and vertical separation have a role to play later 
in the life-cycle of a technology – such as in the middle period when the early scale economies 
have been exhausted.  Rather the learning is that regulation must evolve over the life of a 
technology, as the structures of the markets themselves evolve. For regulation, as with investment, 
timing matters. 
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Figure 1: Natural Monopoly Cost Structure    
 
 
 
Figure 2: Price Discrimination  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Price Discrimination Allows Earlier Introduction of a Technology  
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